中國(guó)不再為世界經(jīng)濟(jì)遮風(fēng)擋雨(金融時(shí)報(bào)雙語(yǔ))
Why China’s role as the world’s shock absorber is changing
Since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, one country more than any other has provided the “heavy lifting” to support global economic growth. That country is China, the world’s second-biggest economy. The most compelling piece of evidence comes from China’s balance of payments position. In 2007, China posted a current account surplus the equivalent of 10.1 per cent of gross domestic product. Last year, the surplus was down to a mere 2.1 per cent of GDP.
自2008年全球金融危機(jī)爆發(fā)以來，在拉動(dòng)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)方面，有一個(gè)國(guó)家“挑起的重?fù)?dān)”超過了其他任何一個(gè)國(guó)家。這個(gè)國(guó)家就是世界上第二大經(jīng)濟(jì)體——中國(guó)。最具說服力的證據(jù)，來自中國(guó)的國(guó)際收支狀況。2007年，中國(guó)的經(jīng)常賬戶盈余相當(dāng)于國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)的10.1%。去年，這個(gè)比例下降到只有2.1%。
This adjustment — enormous in the history of such things — occurred for two key reasons.
從歷史上來看，這樣的變化是非常大的。出現(xiàn)這一變化有兩個(gè)主要原因：
• First, in the light of faltering export growth, Beijing shifted towards a “domestic demand first” policy, thanks to massive stimulus of infrastructure investment. Total investment spending rose from 41 per cent of GDP in 2007 to 47 per cent in 2013. Domestic investment thus rose relative to domestic savings, thereby reducing net capital account outflows.
首先，鑒于出口增長(zhǎng)疲弱，中國(guó)政府借助大規(guī)模刺激措施，即大量增加基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資，轉(zhuǎn)向了“內(nèi)需第一”的政策?？偼顿Y支出占GDP的比例從2007年的41%，升至2013年的47%。因此，國(guó)內(nèi)投資相對(duì)于國(guó)內(nèi)儲(chǔ)蓄出現(xiàn)了上升，從而減少了資本賬戶凈流出。
• Second, despite softening exports, Beijing tolerated continuous currency appreciation. In effect, the rest of the world devalued against the renminbi. Put another way, the combination of an ever-strengthening renminbi and, by international standards, a relatively high inflation rate left China nursing significant competitiveness losses even as others made competitive gains.
其次，盡管出口不景氣，中國(guó)政府容忍了人民幣的持續(xù)升值。實(shí)際上，世界其他地區(qū)的貨幣相對(duì)人民幣都出現(xiàn)了貶值。換句話說，不斷升值的人民幣，加上相對(duì)較高的通脹率(以國(guó)際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)衡量)，使中國(guó)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力出現(xiàn)大幅下滑，而其他國(guó)家的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力上升。
Take these two factors together and it is clear that, in recent years, China was the world’s “consumer of last resort”, a role more traditionally played by the US. As many other nations — particularly the US and much of Europe — embarked on a “great deleveraging”, Beijing provided the counterweight. As others saved, China borrowed — most obviously through a rapid expansion of so-called shadow banking.
綜合以上兩個(gè)因素，明顯可以看出，近年來，中國(guó)成了世界的“最后的消費(fèi)者”，而傳統(tǒng)上這一角色更多是由美國(guó)扮演。隨著其他許多經(jīng)濟(jì)體——尤其是美國(guó)和歐洲部分地區(qū)——開啟“大規(guī)模去杠桿”，北京方面起到了平衡的作用。其他國(guó)家獲救了，但中國(guó)卻負(fù)債累累——最明顯的是影子銀行迅速擴(kuò)張所帶來的債務(wù)膨脹。
Had China not performed this role, the world would have faced a far greater crisis.
如果中國(guó)沒有扮演這樣的角色，世界面臨的危機(jī)可能要嚴(yán)重得多。
Imagine that Chinese infrastructure investment had not surged. Commodity prices would not have recovered in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis. Many emerging nations would have found themselves short of export revenues and, in some cases, faced with immediate balance-of-payments crises.
想象一下，如果中國(guó)沒有大幅增加基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資會(huì)怎樣?那么，在金融危機(jī)后，大宗商品價(jià)格就不會(huì)快速回升。許多新興國(guó)家會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)本國(guó)缺少出口收入，而且在某些情況下，直接面臨著國(guó)際收支危機(jī)。
Or imagine the renminbi had not soared. The rest of the world would not have devalued, monetary conditions for many countries would have been tighter and, as a result, global deflationary pressures would have been far more intense than they have proved to be.
再想象一下，如果人民幣沒有大幅升值，結(jié)果又會(huì)怎樣?世界其他地區(qū)的貨幣就不會(huì)貶值，許多國(guó)家的貨幣環(huán)境會(huì)比現(xiàn)在更加緊縮，結(jié)果是，全球通縮壓力將會(huì)比實(shí)際情況嚴(yán)重得多。
So China has been the shock absorber for the global economy, a punch bag seemingly able to soak up the recessionary blows that would otherwise have derailed global growth.
所以說，中國(guó)充當(dāng)了全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的減震器，像一個(gè)沙袋，似乎能夠吸收那些本可能阻礙全球增長(zhǎng)的衰退沖擊。
Playing the punchbag role has, however, left the country’s economy vulnerable. One simple way to demonstrate this is via changes in consensus expectations for Chinese economic growth. Since 2010, initial growth expectations have simply been too high, a trend that has become worryingly entrenched as the renminbi has strengthened.
然而，扮演沙袋角色使中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)變得脆弱。要證明這一點(diǎn)，一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單方法是觀察對(duì)中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的普遍預(yù)期的變化。自2010年以后，增長(zhǎng)預(yù)期一開始就有點(diǎn)過高，而隨著人民幣走強(qiáng)，這一趨勢(shì)變得穩(wěn)固得令人擔(dān)憂。
Unfortunately, China’s role as a “stabiliser” for the global economy has contributed to instability within the country itself: an overheated property market, a substantial increase in indebtedness, a roller-coaster ride for the stock market and a declining marginal rate of return on capital spending. So the People’s Bank of China’s actions in the second week of August — interpreted variously as either the beginnings of a major devaluation or a modest market-led adjustment — might be regarded instead as part of an attempt to shift the balance of risks away from China back to the rest of the world.
不幸的是，中國(guó)承擔(dān)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)“穩(wěn)定器”的角色已經(jīng)導(dǎo)致本國(guó)內(nèi)部的不穩(wěn)定：過熱的房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)、負(fù)債大幅增加、股市過山車般暴漲暴跌，以及資本支出邊際回報(bào)率下降。因此，中國(guó)央行在今年8月第二周采取的舉措——被解讀為要么是大幅貶值的開始，要么是適度的市場(chǎng)導(dǎo)向調(diào)整——或許可以視為是中國(guó)要讓風(fēng)險(xiǎn)平衡從本國(guó)重新回到世界其他地區(qū)的嘗試的一部分。
After all, no economy can forever be a shock absorber. The last decade has shown that: the US bumped into the subprime crisis, the eurozone periphery ended up with a series of sovereign bond crises and Greece ultimately suffered an economic collapse on a par with the Great Depression.
畢竟，任何經(jīng)濟(jì)體都不可能永遠(yuǎn)充當(dāng)減震器。過去十年的經(jīng)歷表明了這一點(diǎn)：美國(guó)發(fā)生了次貸危機(jī)，歐元區(qū)外圍國(guó)家接連遭遇主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī)，希臘最終陷入了一場(chǎng)不亞于“大蕭條”(Great Depression)的經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)。
China’s currency actions should be seen in this light. The last thing it now needs is a further appreciation of the real exchange rate. To countenance an additional upward move would potentially create imbalances reminiscent of those the European periphery saw in the years before the onset of the 2010-2012 eurozone crisis.
應(yīng)該從這個(gè)角度來看待中國(guó)的匯率調(diào)整舉措。中國(guó)現(xiàn)在最不需要的就是人民幣實(shí)際匯率的進(jìn)一步升值。容許人民幣繼續(xù)上行有可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致失衡，就好比歐元區(qū)外圍國(guó)家在2010年至2012年歐元區(qū)危機(jī)爆發(fā)前幾年的情形一樣。
This implies that the global economy may need a new shock absorber. Many have pinned their hopes on a sustained US recovery yet, to date, any acceleration in growth has been, to say the least, modest. Moreover, if the Federal Reserve decides to raise interest rates before the year is out, the US economy’s ability to act as a shock absorber may be compromised.
這意味著，全球經(jīng)濟(jì)可能需要一個(gè)新的減震器。許多人寄望于美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)持續(xù)復(fù)蘇，然而迄今為止，美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)并未顯著提速。此外，如果美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)(Fed)決定在年底前加息，美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)充當(dāng)減震器的能力可能打折扣。
The alternative is for the US dollar — rather than the economy — to play the role. China may not have intended to fire a shot across the Fed’s bows but the warning is clear: should the Fed choose to raise interest rates alongside a new “market-led” attitude from Beijing, the danger is that the dollar could climb into the stratosphere. Under those circumstances, we could see collapsing emerging market currencies, a currency-led tightening of US monetary conditions and an American recovery that all too quickly melts away. From a global perspective, it would make more sense for the Fed to leave monetary policy on hold.
另一種選擇是讓美元(而非美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì))扮演這種角色。中國(guó)或許并非有意向美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)發(fā)出警告，但其中的警示意味卻很明顯：如果美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)選擇加息，再加上北京方面的“市場(chǎng)導(dǎo)向”新態(tài)度，美元匯率很可能大幅攀升。在那種情況下，我們可能看到新興市場(chǎng)貨幣崩潰，美國(guó)貨幣環(huán)境因匯率因素所致的緊縮，以及很快煙消云散的美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇。從全球角度來看，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)保持貨幣政策不變更明智。
It is easy to criticise China’s internal imbalances. But failing to take into account the role these played in stabilising the global economy is a major mistake. It doubtless makes sense for China now to address its imbalances. Yet, as it does so, the rest of the world will need to find a new shock absorber. It’s not at all obvious whether any economy is up to the task.
批評(píng)中國(guó)內(nèi)部失衡是很容易的。但如果不考慮這些失衡在穩(wěn)定全球經(jīng)濟(jì)中的作用，那將是大錯(cuò)。中國(guó)現(xiàn)在解決其失衡問題無疑是明智的。然而，在中國(guó)這么做的時(shí)候，全球其他地區(qū)將需要找到一個(gè)新的減震器。是否有經(jīng)濟(jì)體可以擔(dān)此重任，現(xiàn)在還一點(diǎn)都不明顯。
Stephen King is HSBC’s senior economic adviser and author of ‘When the Money Runs Out’
本文作者是匯豐銀行(HSBC)高級(jí)經(jīng)濟(jì)顧問，著有《當(dāng)金錢枯竭：西方富裕日子的終結(jié)》(When the Money Runs Out)一書
